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IS PERCEPTION REALITY?:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE USE OF RULE
403 FOR THE EXCLUSION OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EXPERT TESTIMONY
Chelsea Moore

*

“But as an expert witness I try to make sure that two victims do not
emerge from this crime, that an innocent person is not put behind bars
while a guilty person is allowed to go free.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
DNA evidence has been used to exonerate almost two hundred
individuals since 1989; of those two hundred people, approximately
seventy-five percent were convicted based on evidence including inac2
curate eyewitness identifications.
Imagine being tried and convicted based on an eyewitness testimony, a piece of evidence that scientific studies since 1923 have
shown to be both unreliable and inaccurate.3 Now imagine that expert
testimony regarding the inaccuracy of eyewitness identifications is
inadmissible at trial due to the historic role that eyewitness testimony
has played in the conviction of countless individuals, when this expert

*
J.D., 2011, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank the
following: Professor Howard M. Wasserman, for his guidance and assistance from the beginning;
Professor Kerri L. Stone, for her encouragement and friendship; my family, especially my mom,
Leith, for their continuous love and support.
1
ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT 72 (1991) [hereinafter LOFTUS & KETCHAM,
WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE].
2
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2009),
available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/The_Justice%20Project_Eyewitness_Identification_%20A_Policy_Review.pdf.
3
Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court- A Short Historical Perspective, 39 HOW. L.J. 237, 242 (1995). The questioning of eyewitness identification has also been
dated back to 1908 when Hugo Munsterberg wrote, On the Witness Stand. He recognized that
eyewitness evidence was much more inaccurate as generally thought. THE JUSTICE PROJECT,
supra note 2, at 5.
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opinion may have been the difference between a verdict of “guilty”
and “not guilty.”
Take the incredulous case of eyewitness identifications leading to
the arrest of Sergeant Timothy Hennis. Hennis was accused of the
4
gruesome murder of a mother and her children. There was no physical evidence and no motive, and the entire case hinged on two eyewit5
ness testimonies. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus commented that these testimonies were “two of the flimsiest eyewitness accounts” she had ever
6
heard. Hennis was convicted of the murders and sentenced to death
in 1986.7 The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and granted
Hennis a new trial in 1988, and, in its discussion, the court recognized
8
the unreliability of the eyewitness testimonies. The first witness revised his impression of the stature and build of the man he claimed to
have seen. Due to his revision, the court held that the testimony was
9
overtly tenuous. The second witness originally stated that she had
not seen anyone.10 Therefore, her testimony stating that she had seen
the defendant was tentative at best.11 After a new trial, this innocent
man was acquitted and released, but he could never be compensated
for the years he spent on death row, away from his family and friends.
Perhaps if an expert on eyewitness identification had been introduced
in his first trial this travesty of justice would not have occurred.
Over 75,000 people a year become criminal defendants on the
basis of eyewitness identification testimony.12 Erroneous eyewitness
identification is one of the most frequent causes of mistaken convic13
tions in the United States. One 1996 study found that twenty-eight
convictions based upon eyewitness identifications have been overturned as a result of DNA evidence, and another study stated that
mistaken eyewitness identifications caused more than sixty percent of

4
Major Joshua M. Toman, Time to Kill: Euthanizing the Requirement for Presidential
Approval of Military Death Sentences to Restore Finality of Legal Review, 195 MIL. L. REV. 1, 64
(2008).
5
State v. Hennis, 372 S.E.2d 523, 525 (N.C. 1988).
6
LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 114.
7
Id. at 109.
8
Hennis, 372 S.E.2d at 525.
9
Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 178 (2006) (citing Press Release, Nat’l Sci.
Found., False Identification: New Research Seeks to Inoculate Eyewitnesses Against Errors
(Jan. 3, 1997), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1997/pr971/ pr971.txt).
13 Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t - Unless It Also
Curbs Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 263 (2002).
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14
the wrongful convictions that were studied. As part of an effort to
curb the overwhelming effect that eyewitness testimony has on the
jury, defense attorneys have increasingly been relying on experts to
lessen that impact.15
“Our criminal justice system is not foolproof; it fails more often
16
than it is comfortable to contemplate.” There are countless documented cases where eyewitness identification proved to be wrong. In
one study, out of eighty-six defendants who had been sentenced to
death but later exonerated because of other strong evidence, fifty-four
percent of those cases involved eyewitness testimony, and in thirtyeight percent of the cases, eyewitness testimony was the only evidence
against the defendant.17
One example of eyewitness identification causing injustice is the
case of Isadore Zimmerman. Zimmerman was tried and convicted for
the murder of a New York City patrolman during a robbery in 1937.18
After he was given his last meal and prepared for the electric chair, a
guard came in to announce that his sentence had been reduced to life
19
in prison. After being in prison for twenty-four years, new advanced
laboratory techniques were used to prove that Zimmerman could not
have committed the crime, and he was subsequently released.20
Most studies suggest that eyewitness accounts are not as reliable
as often believed. Despite this, few courts have recognized the value
of experts testifying on the subject, even when the Federal Rules of
Evidence appear to allow such testimony as evidence. Rejection of
this sort of testimony based on Rule 403 is attributable to courts’ concern that the expert, instead of the jury, will make the credibility determination of the eyewitness.21 Though the jury should make the
ultimate credibility determination, experts informing the jury on the
misconceptions of the reliability of the eyewitness would enhance the
jury’s knowledge, help guide the jury in finding the relevant facts in a
more informed way, and guide the jury to properly weigh the eyewitness testimony.22

14 John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications,
28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 209 (2001).
15 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
16 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 11.
17 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 19.
18 LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 11.
19 Id.
20 Id. (stating that in 1983, forty-four years after Zimmerman was scheduled to die in the
electric chair, the New York State Court of Claims awarded Zimmerman one million dollars,
one of the largest awards for wrongful imprisonment).
21 See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999).
22 See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1221 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
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Courts have varied in their responses to the proffer of eyewitness
identification expert testimony. Some courts have held that the evidence was properly excluded on the ground that eyewitness identification was not a key issue, and, therefore, the proffered expert testimo23
ny was not relevant. Other courts have stated that the expert testimony was not necessary because cross-examination of the eyewitness
24
should be sufficient. Further, some courts have held that expert testimony might threaten the right of the jury to assess witness credibili25
ty, while other courts find that the jury already understands how
memory works.26 Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 has provided
some courts with the ammunition to exclude this expert testimony on
the basis that the expert might usurp the function of the jury, would
lead to confusion, or would be a waste of time.27
This Comment attempts to resolve the circuit split over whether
courts should admit eyewitness identification expert testimony under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. This Comment considers the potential
impact these experts will have on the jury, and whether, given the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, these experts are necessary. This
Comment argues that experts should not be excluded on the basis of
Rule 403, but rather the admission of this testimony should be left
within the discretion of the trial court to determine if the expert comports with Rule 702.
II. BACKGROUND ON EXPERTS, EYEWITNESS FLAWS,
AND EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EXPERTS
“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identifica28
tion.”
Larry Fuller spent over eighteen years in prison after being
wrongfully convicted of aggravated rape as the result of an erroneous
identification.29 The eyewitness first stated that the perpetrator was
clean-shaven and identified Fuller’s photograph in a photo-lineup (an
23

See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299-300 (9th Cir. 1987).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992)) (finding that an expert “will not aid the jury
because it addresses an issue of which the jury already generally is aware, and it will not contribute to their understanding of the particular factual issues posed”); State v. Lawhorn, 762
S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988).
27 United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Kime, 99
F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992).
28 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
29 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 14.
24
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30
old picture taken when Fuller did not have a beard). The problem
was, at the time of the crime, Fuller actually had a beard, directly con31
trasting how the eyewitness initially described the perpetrator. Fuller was later excluded as the rapist through advanced DNA testing
methods, and Governor Rick Perry granted him a full pardon in Jan32
uary 2007.

A. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
“Jurors who think they understand how memory works may be
mistaken, and if these mistakes influence their evaluation of testimony then they may convict innocent persons. A court should not dis33
miss scientific knowledge about everyday subjects.”
The first test that determined the admissibility of expert testimo34
ny was the Frye test. In Frye v. United States, the D.C. Circuit required that the expert not only had to have the credentials to qualify
as an expert, but also had to show that the scientific theory and methodology upon which his testimony was grounded met a threshold of
reliability.35 The Frye test created a “general acceptance” standard.36
The principles for admission of expert testimony at trial were formulated based on reliability and whether the scientific evidence had
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.37
Then, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.
These rules led to an increasing acceptance of expert testimony generally, and Rule 702 liberalized the admissibility of expert witness tes38
timony. Rule 702 provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable

30

Id.
Id.
32 Id.
33 United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
34 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35 Id. at 1014; see also Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for Lie Detection, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 14 (2008).
36 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
37 Id.
38 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
31
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principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the prin39
ciples and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Rule 704 abolished the “ultimate issue” objection that blocked
witnesses, both lay and expert, from testifying directly to facts that the
fact-finder must determine.40 The “ultimate issue” objection was often worded as “usurping the function of the jury.”41 Rule 704(a) provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), the testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
42
of fact.” The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 704(b) rejects the
“empty rhetoric” notion that some expert testimony is inadmissible
because it usurps the “province of the jury.”43
Of course, there is a way for the judge to keep out evidence and
act as “gatekeeper” if she feels as though the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice,
waste of time, or confusion of the jury, and this is through Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.44 However, Rule 403 is written in a way to favor admissibility.45 Rule 403 presumes admissibility by stating that
evidence “may be excluded” if the court determines that the “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”46
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that it
had moved away from the Frye test to a position that was in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.47 The Supreme Court de48
cided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which involved a
suit brought by two children and their parents against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, which had allegedly caused birth defects.49 The
lower courts had granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg39

FED. R. EVID. 702.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 620 (6th ed. 2008); see also FED. R. EVID. 704.
41 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 40.
42 FED. R. EVID. 704(a).
43 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1220 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
44 The text of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 reads: “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
45 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
46 Id. (emphasis added); accord Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2011 (1994) (“[R]ule [403] is clearly biased in favor of
admissibility.”).
47 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 582.
40
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ment based on the defendant’s well-qualified expert’s affidavit that
stated that the drug did not cause birth defects; and while the plaintiffs brought forth other experts on the subject to show the opposite,
the evidence was found not to meet the “general acceptance” test es50
tablished in Frye. The Supreme Court reversed the motion to dismiss, acknowledging that “[n]othing in the text of Rule 702 establishes
51
general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility,”
thereby making the Federal Rules of Evidence the test to determine
52
the admissibility of expert witnesses.
Daubert established that it is Rule 702, and not federal common
law, that governs the admissibility of expert testimony.53 This decision
also rejected the “general acceptance” test established in Frye, instead
incorporating the “general acceptance” requirement into considerations that courts should look to when deciding whether to admit ex54
pert testimony. These factors included whether the expert would
testify as to “scientific knowledge,” and whether the testimony would
assist the trier of fact.55 The factors for the lower court to use when
deciding whether the expert would testify to:
[S]cientific knowledge include whether the scientific theory has
been or could be tested, whether the scientific theory has been
subjected to peer review, whether accuracy rates regarding the
scientific basis for the evidence are known, whether standards for
application of the technique exist, and whether the theory or
technique has gained general acceptance.56
These factors were not to be rigidly applied, and, in a later case,
the Court stated that “the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district
courts to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than
would have been admissible under Frye . . . .”57 The Court later estab58
lished that the Daubert test applies to experts in all cases.

50

Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 587.
52 William David Gross, The Unfortunate Faith: A Solution to the Unwarranted Reliance
upon Eyewitness Testimony, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 307, 321 (1999).
53 Hon. Robert P. Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony Under the
Federal Rules, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 379, 380 (1999).
54 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
55 Id. at 592-93.
56 Id. at 593-94.
57 Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); accord Eric K. Gerard, supra note
35, at 34.
58 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
51
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Flaws of Eyewitnesses
[E]yewitnesses who point their finger at innocent defendants are
not liars, for they genuinely believe in the truth of their testimony. . . . The face of innocence has become the face of guilt.
That’s the frightening part the truly horrifying idea that our
memories can be changed, inextricably altered, and that what we
think we know, what we believe with all our hearts, is not neces59
sarily the truth.

The reliability of eyewitness identification has been questioned
not only by those in the field of psychology but also by the courts. To
prevent misidentifications, the Supreme Court, in Manson v. Brathwaite,60 reiterated that the criteria for examining the reliability of iden61
tifications set down in Neil v. Biggers is still essential. The Court in
Brathwaite and Biggers identified five factors that a trier of fact must
consider when evaluating the accuracy of an eyewitness account.
These factors include: the eyewitness’ opportunity to view the criminal during the crime; the length of time in which the eyewitness got to
view the criminal; the level of certainty demonstrated by the eyewitness; the accuracy of the eyewitness’ description prior to identifying
the criminal; and the eyewitness’ attention while the crime was occurring.62 However, these instructions from the Court, as well as the due
process procedure requirements and standard articulated by the
Court in various cases, may not be enough as many factors influence
eyewitness identification, and these factors are best discussed by an
63
expert.
The Supreme Court in Brathwaite held that the lower courts may
overlook highly suggestive police identification techniques used during a photo lineup if there are other reliability factors that indicate the
totality of the circumstances suggest the eyewitness made the identification based on her memory of the crime.64 The problem with this
allowance is that the lower courts would be dismissing what research
59

LOFTUS & KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 13.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1997).
61 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
62 Id. at 199-200; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
63 Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 445-47 (2009). The Supreme Court has articulated the due
process standard for eyewitness identification in Simmons v. United States, Kirby v. Illinois, Neil
v. Biggers, and Manson v. Brathwaite. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)
(holding that in order to determine whether an eyewitness should be able to identify a defendant
at trial, a due process test must be applied); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (holding
that due process “forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification”); Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113-14.
64 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115-16; see also Wise, supra note 63, at 448.
60
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has shown: that many other factors (other than the five proscribed by
the Supreme Court in Biggers and Brathwaite) affect eyewitness iden65
tifications. The lower courts would ignore the fact that research has
shown that at least one factor that the Supreme Court has established,
the certainty of an eyewitness, is not determinative of accuracy, and,
in fact, suggestive procedures can increase the certainty of an eyewitness and an eyewitness’ confidence and is not at all indicative of the
reliability of an identification.66 Instead, courts should allow experts
to testify about factors that do influence memory and perception.
Many factors influence how an individual remembers an event.
The bio-psycho-social factors that affect memory include perception,
the phases of memory, and the variables that impact perception and
memory, and the systemic factors.67 Memory depends on perception,
and the process that goes into perception is highly selective.68
Memory is often misunderstood. Human memory does not
record events in the way that a video camera would, rather memory is
more selective.69 One aspect of identification often misunderstood is
what is known as “weapon focus.” When a weapon is involved during
a crime the attention of a witness is focused on the weapon and the
attention the witness is paying to the culprit’s facial and physical cha70
racteristics is reduced. Jurors sometimes believe that presence of a
weapon can increase the reliability of eyewitness identifications,71 and
this sort of mistaken belief is what experts would come in to court to
educate the jury on.
There are several factors that impact perception and memory.
First, time is a significant factor, including the amount of time between relaying an event and the event taking place, and the rate at
which an event happens.72 Second, the significance of the event and
the violence that occurs during the event impacts perception. The
violence level of a crime matters because, even when witnesses understand the significance of the event, the more violent the act, the lower
the accuracy will be in perception and memory.73 Studies have shown

65

Wise, supra note 63, at 449.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of an eyewitness’
confidence as an indication of accuracy); see also Wise, supra note 63, at 449.
67 Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2007).
68 Robert Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
75, 76 (1976).
69 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 195.
70 Id. at 196.
71 Id. at 197.
72 Fradella, supra note 67, at 17.
73 Id. at 19-20.
66
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that a person’s ability to recall specific details of an event is worse if a
74
witness has observed a violent event. Third, contrary to what is often believed, high stress levels can cause people not to pay sufficient
attention and can negatively impact the ability of an individual to concentrate.75 Stress is often believed to aid memory, when, in reality,
76
stress actually impairs memory. Fourth, stereotypes can influence
how a person perceives a situation,77 as well as the age and gender of a
witness.78
It is almost uncontroverted that human memory process takes
place in three stages, including “perception of the event,” “retention,”
and “retrieval of the stored information.”79 During the perception
80
stage, also known as the acquisition stage, time, frequency, detail
salience, and the degree of violence all affect the initial perception.81
Other factors such as stress, expectations, perceptual activity, and
82
prior experience also affect the perception of the witness. Expectations can play a role in the process of memory, what someone expects
to see will influence how an event is acquired and internalized.83
Next, during the retention stage, the information is still “suscept84
ible to all forms of interference and decay.” Factors include time,
post-event information, and intervening thoughts.85 Any one of these
factors can influence the way in which the eyewitness remembers the
event, and can even reinforce the identification, even if it is not accurate.86
74 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 197 (finding that thirty-nine percent of respondents
believed that violence would make memory more reliable and thirty-three percent thought
violence would have no effect at all).
75 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
241, 254-55 (1986).
76 Gross, supra note 52, at 316-17 (citing a 1998 study finding that when mice were placed
in a controlled environment and stress was added in the form of a cat, the mice forgot the location of the exit, showing the effect stress has on memory).
77 Kerri L. Pickel, The Influence of Context on the “Weapon Focus” Effect, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 299, 299-311 (1999).
78 Fradella, supra note 67, at *24 (discussing how age is an important factor, and how
children usually fail to retain as many details as adults, but the “correct” information children
can retain is similar to that of adults, and how gender may have some significance, as women
have been shown to have a slightly higher accuracy rate in facial recognition).
79 Cindy O’Hagan, When Seeing is not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 745 (1993).
80 Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 242 (1996).
81 O’Hagan, supra note 79.
82 Id.
83 Cohen, supra note 80, at 245-46.
84 O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 746.
85 Id.
86 See id.
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During the retrieval stage, factors such as retrieval environment,
specificity, and the wording of a question can influence what the eye87
witness remembers. One common trait is that when a witness is
asked to recall an event they believe the event took longer than it actually did.88 Also a witness’ ability to recall a violent crime is often
89
worse than recalling a non-violent crime. It may be surprising that
the environment in which the witness is questioned matters in the recalling of the event and how a witness is questioned in terms of the
types of questions, and whether they are open-ended or not, also plays
a significant role in the ability to recall.90
Other factors that have been known to lead to misidentifications
91
include cross-racial identifications, the ways in which lineups are
92
conducted, presence of a weapon during the crime,93 and postidentification confirmation.94
95
Cross-racial identifications are especially unreliable. In fact, “it
is well documented that cross-racial identification is less reliable than
identification of one person by another of the same race. Considerable evidence indicates that people are poorer at identifying members
of another race than their own.”96 Studies have shown that when jurors are asked to compare the reliability of an identification by an
eyewitness of the same race versus an eyewitness of a different race,
the jurors are often “ill-informed about the inaccuracy of cross-racial
identification.”97 People v. McDonald is one of the few cases overturned because the lower court did not allow an expert to testify on
eyewitness testimony, when the central issue in the case was cross-

87

Id. at 746-47.
Cohen, supra note 80, at 248.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Studies have shown that cross-race identifications are more difficult for an eyewitness
than are within-race identifications. Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Eyewitness Identification:
Issues in Common Knowledge and Generalization, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 159, 161 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Wells & Hasel, Eyewitness Identification].
92 Studies suggest that “failure to warn eyewitnesses prior to viewing a lineup that the
actual perpetrator might not be present serves to increase the chances of a mistaken identification when the perpetrator is not in the lineup.” Id.
93 Studies suggest that the presence of a weapon during a crime diminishes the ability of
the eyewitness to accurately identify. Id.
94 Studies suggest that post-identification confirmation distorts an eyewitness’ ability to
recollect what they saw. Id.
95 Rutledge, supra note 14, at 211.
96 State v. Reddick, 619 A.2d 453, 467 n.1 (Conn. 1993) (Berdon, J., dissenting).
97 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 200.
88
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racial identification and experts have shown that people have difficul98
ty identifying people of other races.
99
Another reliability factor is that, often, when a show-up occurs
and the police display a single subject, this tends to be very suggestive
to the eyewitness and the Supreme Court has acknowledged the great
risk of misidentification when show-ups occur, as compared to lineups.100 “Whereas courts have generally construed of show-ups as a
form of pressure on the witness to make a positive identification,
eyewitness experiments tend to show that rates of positive identification are actually lower for show-ups than for lineups.”101 But when
lineups are properly constructed (i.e., a lineup having at least five
102
good fillers), show-ups are more likely to yield false identifica103
tions.
Lineup instructions can affect the identification by an eyewitness.
“Telling the prospective witness to pick someone or no one based
upon their personal perception and recollection of an incident is the
fair technique.”104 But when an officer tells the witness to “pick the
one who did it,” this increases the likelihood of the witness making a
105
choice from those presented, even if it is not accurate.
Sequential identification, however, is one way to avoid some of
the unreliability of the traditional identification. Unlike a traditional
lineup, sequential identifications take place when an eyewitness views
each person individually, one person at a time, and decides whether
the person is in fact the culprit before viewing the next person, rather
than having all members standing together and having the eyewitness
106
The benefit of sequential
identify one person out of the group.
identifications is that the eyewitness will not make relative judgments
107
about the individuals in the group. In other words, the eyewitness
will not directly compare one individual to another and choose the
person who looks most like the perpetrator when compared to the
98

People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1984); see also Gross, supra note 52, at 315.
A show-up is an identification procedure in which a witness identifies a suspect one-onone, being the only suspect shown to the eyewitness. Amy Luria, Show Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and a Discussion of Necessary Changes, 86 NEB. L. REV.
515, 515-16 (2008).
100 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 200-01.
101 Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and
the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 7 (2008).
102 Id.
103 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 200.
104 Gross, supra note 52, at 317-18.
105 Id.
106 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 202-03.
107 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 3.
99
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others in the group, and ultimately may pick an innocent person because the eyewitness does not feel as though there is an option that
108
But jurors have been found to be
the culprit is not in the lineup.
unaware of the fact that sequential identifications are more accurate
than lineups.109 In one study, over three-quarters mistakenly thought
the reliability of line-ups was more or equal to the reliability of show110
To assist the jury in understanding the difference and in deups.
termining the accuracy of the identification, an expert witness would
testify and simply tutor the jury so that the jury could make the ultimate credibility determination of the eyewitness.111
One other factor that some jurors are unaware can affect an eyewitness identification is the fact that the person who administers the
identification procedure can influence the reliability of the eyewitness
testimony.112 And, as shown in one study, a “bare majority of potential jurors” understood that having a police officer that was unaware
113
Again, the potential
who the suspect is could make a difference.
influence of an officer’s opinion is one thing that an expert could assist the jury in understanding and then the jury could make a credibility determination in the end. No matter what identification process is
used, the fact that the procedure needs to be “double blind” is essen114
tial to proper identifications. The officer performing the identification must not know which subject is in fact the suspect so as not to
(unintentionally) influence the eyewitness or interpret what the eye115
witness states in such a way as to fit the suspect.
These factors depend on psychological issues pertaining to perception and memory, causing a need for expert witnesses on this topic.
As with any statistic, the numbers vary on the percentage of times in
which eyewitness identifications are incorrect. Eyewitnesses identify
a known wrong person in approximately twenty percent of all real
criminal lineups. This means that one in five real eyewitnesses willing
to give sworn testimony are wrong, and yet would put a person behind
bars for a long time.116
108

Id. at 4-5.
Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 202-03.
110 See id. at 203.
111 See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 9.
112 Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 203-04.
113 Id. at 203.
114 See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2.
115 Id. at 7-8.
116 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1489-90 (2008) (citing Gary L.
Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 291 (2003);
Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's Blind Sequential
Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 381, 396 (2006); Tim Valentine et
109
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In response to the fact that eyewitness identifications are not as
reliable as jurors might assume, besides expert testimony on the subject, courts have tried other methods to limit the effect of the eyewitness testimony. Some courts have relied on jury instructions as a way
117
to lessen the weight of an eyewitness identification testimony, while
118
other courts seem to think cross-examination should be enough.
However, both of these have flaws and may have no real impact on
the jury. Cross-examination, for example, might not be as effective
because the eyewitness is telling what she believes is the truth, and,
therefore, is likely to be believed by the jury and cross-examination
loses its effectiveness.119
Special jury instructions are not effective either. Often, omission
of special instructions regarding faulty eyewitness identifications is
only a prejudicial error when identification is the “central issue” or
“there is no corroborating evidence,” leaving the matter only within
the trial court’s discretion.120
The confidence of an eyewitness also has an effect on whether
121
the jury believes the identification to be accurate. However, a witness’s confidence is not indicative of the accuracy of the identification,
rather “confidence is a product of personality and social factors of
122
which accuracy of observation is only a minor part.” An eyewitness’
confidence of her identification can fluctuate based on events after
the initial identification, this has been referred to as “confidence mal123
leability.” One study found that seventy-five percent of the prosecutors surveyed and fifty-six percent of the citizens surveyed incorrectly believed that confident witnesses are likely to be more accurate
124
than those that are not confident. Of course, “the correlation between confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identifications is far
al., Characteristics of Eyewitness Identification that Predict the Outcome of Real Lineups, 17
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 969, 973 (2003)).
117 Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness
Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1916 (2005) (citing United
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
118 Id. at 1905.
119 Id.
120 Rutledge, supra note 14, at 225 (quoting State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 427, 464 (N.J.
1999)); see also Peter J. Cohen, supra note 80, at 251 (discussing an experiment in which a jury
was more likely to believe an eyewitness when the eyewitness provided little details and exerted
confidence in his/her demeanor).
121 See Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 198-99.
122 Id. at 199 (examining survey results and finding that “jurors have no meaningful idea of
how to evaluate witness statements of confidence and are likely to substantially overestimate the
reliability of a confidence witness”).
123 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 5.
124 Rutledge, supra note 14, at 223 (citing Steven Penrod, Witness Confidence and Witness
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 817-22 (1995)).
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125
Also, some confidence can be
lower than people would expect.”
falsely obtained from lineup procedures where an eyewitness is unintentionally reaffirmed in their belief, once again showing the need for
a double-blind lineup procedure.126 Again, this is something that an
expert could address if allowed to testify during trial, and may allow
the jury to understand the complexity behind identifications, and understand that confidence of an eyewitness does not translate into accuracy.
So, while expert testimony might not be a full-proof way of get127
ting the idea of the unreliability of eyewitness across to the jury, it
seems to be one of the more efficient methods.

C.

The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

The experts that testify as to eyewitness identifications are typically psychologists specializing in human memory.128 These experts do
not generally give an opinion about the accuracy of a specific identification, but instead testify as to the human memory process and describe the psychological factors that tend to affect the reliability of
memory.129
The first reported decision regarding eyewitness identification
130
expert testimony, Criglow v. State, was decided in 1931. In Criglow,
the defendant wanted to call an expert to give his opinion as to the
recollection of two eyewitnesses.131 Neither of the two eyewitnesses
had ever seen the defendant prior to the robbery, and the defendant
wanted the expert to testify as to the weaknesses in eyewitness testimony.132 The trial court excluded this expert, and the Supreme Court
133
of Arkansas affirmed. The court held that the question of whether
the witnesses were mistaken in their identification was a question for
the jury, and not an expert witness.134 The court found that because
125

Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401 (3d Cir. 1991)).
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 8.
127 There is research indicating that when both parties produce expert testimony, jurors
tend to discount all the expert testimony. See Lora M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The
Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 364-65 (2008).
128 O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 755.
129 Id. at 755-56.
130 Criglow v. State, 36 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1931); see also Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role
of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 324 (2004).
131 Criglow, 36 S.W.2d at 401.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
126
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the question put to the expert was one that “one man as well as
another” might answer, it was within the realm of passing upon the
credibility and weight of testimony, which the court felt should remain
135
exclusively the jury's function.
In 1952, a California appellate court in People v. Collier, also
found that the jury’s role would be usurped by the admission of expert
testimony on eyewitness identifications.136 In Collier, the defendant
wanted to introduce an expert, a psychology professor, to testify as to
137
the reliability of a victim’s observation of the defendant. The California Supreme Court held that the evidence was not within the
“proper field of expert testimony” and “was a matter within the prov138
ince of the jury,” and the expert was therefore excluded.
In 1973, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Amaral, a case
in which the defendant was charged with two counts of bank robbery,
and a significant portion of the government’s case rested on identification by an eyewitness.139 The defense proffered testimony of a psychologist, who would have explained the effects of stress on percep140
tion. The trial judge excluded the testimony, ruling it would be inappropriate to take from the jury the determination of the weight to
be given to the eyewitness testimony.141 In this threshold federal case
the Ninth Circuit excluded the expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness identification on the basis that the unreliability of eyewitness testimony and the effects of stress on perception were not outside
the common understanding of the juror and that these were not proper subjects for expert opinion testimony.142
This case set forth a four-part test for the admissibility of expert
testimony, requiring that: first, the defense offer a qualified witness;
second, that the expert testify on a proper subject for expert or opinion testimony on particular factor outside an ordinary person’s understanding; third, that the expert testify through an analysis that is
generally accepted in the scientific community; and finally, that the
143
probative value of the testimony outweigh any unfair prejudice.
This case became a highly influential case from the Ninth Circuit and

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 401.
People v. Collier, 249 P.2d 72, 78 (Cal. 1952).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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determined that the jury should decide the weight of the evidence of
144
an eyewitness testimony, not an expert.
Then, in 1983, the Arizona Supreme Court was one of the first to
finally allow the use of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.145 State v. Chapple became one of the first cases
where a court allowed the use of expert testimony about the reliability
146
The Arizona Supreme Court held that,
of eyewitness testimony.
under the facts, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to ex147
clude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
The court followed the Amaral criteria and found that the criteria
were met based upon the facts of the case. The court disagreed with
other courts disallowing expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because the matter is within the common knowledge of the jury,
reasoning that Rule 702 only requires an expert's testimony to assist
the jury in determining an issue.148 The court found that an expert
could testify to general factors that might affect the reliability of the
witnesses, but the expert could not testify to the accuracy of the spe149
cific identifications the witness made.
Federal circuit courts of appeals started to reverse district courts’
decisions not to admit eyewitness experts in 1985.150 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals became the first federal circuit court to reverse a
lower court’s exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony and remand
the case for a hearing regarding the admissibility of the expert testi151
mony. United States v. Downing, however, discarded the four-part
test of Amaral and substituted a three-part test.152 First, the trial judge
was to balance the reliability of the scientific principles upon which
the proffered testimony rests and the testimony’s potential to aid the
jury to reach an accurate resolution of a disputed issue, against the
likelihood that the testimony might overwhelm or mislead the jury.153
Second, the defense had to show that the proffered testimony “fits” a
154
specific problem in the identification at issue. Finally, even where
proposed evidence might satisfy the first two requirements, the trial

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Woller, supra note 130, at 325.
Id.
State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1219.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id.; O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 768.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224.
Id. at 1238.
Id.
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155
court still retains discretion under Rule 403. The trouble with the
court’s holding in Downing is that the court found it will only review a
trial court decision if eyewitness testimony was the only evidence in
the case, and not otherwise, thereby making this ruling not a clear
solution.156
In United States v. Rincon, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the admissibility of experts on eyewitness identifications is
to be based on an individualized inquiry rather than a strict rule.157 In
1993, pre-Daubert, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s
decision that the defendant failed to establish the general acceptance
or probative value of the subject of the expert’s testimony.158 Following remand by the Supreme Court after Daubert, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the trial court, which once again excluded the
testimony of the expert.159 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that the
defendant’s proffered expert testimony failed to satisfy the Daubert
160
standard. And although the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant
failed to establish that the evidence was scientific, the court went on
to decide that the evidence would help the trier of fact and was “no
doubt relevant to his defense.”161 The court, however, stated that the
alternative means for enhancing jurors’ awareness on the problems
with eyewitness identifications, such as jury instructions, were available and should be used instead of expert testimony. “Given the powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mislead the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding
that the proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it
162
was likely to mislead the jury.” The court recognized that the result
in this case was based on an individualized inquiry and not a strict rule
163
regarding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications. Also, this
idea that the jury will overwhelmingly believe the expert and put too
much weight on their testimony appears to ignore evidence that jurors
usually are skeptical of expert testimony.164

155

Id. at 1239-41.
O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 768-69.
157 United States v. Rincon (Rincon II), 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1029 (1994).
158 United States v. Rincon (Rincon I), 984 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.), vacated, 510 U.S. 801
(1993).
159 Rincon II, 28 F.3d at 922.
160 Id. at 922-24.
161 Id. at 925.
162 Id. at 926.
163 Id.
164 Wise, supra note 63, at 453-54 (citing CHARLES PATRICK EWING, TRIALS OF A
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST: A CASEBOOK 18 (2008)).
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Overall, while some circuit courts have left the admissibility of
165
eyewitness identification experts at the discretion of the trial courts,
some courts state that allowing these experts to testify will undermine
the confidence in all eyewitness identifications and cause a battle of
experts.166 Other courts question the validity of the science behind
167
Furthermore, other courts exclude exeyewitness identifications.
perts on the general reliability of eyewitness identifications due to the
belief that this was a matter of common understanding and would not
168
have aided the jury in determining the accuracy of the identification.
Some courts have gone further and exclude this testimony on the basis
of Rule 403 and the idea that it will mislead the jury or usurp the
province of the jury.
D. The Split on Rule 403
That a subject is within daily experience does not mean that jurors know it correctly. A major conclusion of the social sciences
is that many beliefs based on personal experience are mistaken.
The lessons of social science thus may be especially valuable
when jurors are sure that they understand something, for these
beliefs may be hard for lawyers to overcome with mere argument
169
and assertion.
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have split with the
Third and Sixth Circuits over whether eyewitness identification expert
testimony would violate Rule 403.170 The Third and Sixth Circuits
hold that this sort of expert opinion comports with Rule 403, whereas
the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits hold that the expert testimony will usurp the jury’s role, and therefore is inadmissible under
Rule 403.171
The Third and Sixth Circuits have allowed experts on eyewitness
identifications into evidence, finding that this sort of testimony com165 See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 388 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Welch, 368
F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2004); Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1147-48 (D.C. 2004); United
States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jackson, 50 F.3d 1335, 1340
(5th Cir. 1995); Parker v. State, 968 S.W.2d 592, 596-97 (Ark. 1998); Campbell v. People, 814
P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1991).
166 United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299-300 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1994).
167 United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 620-25 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Poole,
794 F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1986).
168 United States v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d
964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992).
169 United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
170 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1219 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
171 Id. at 1220.
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ports with Rule 403. The Third Circuit has held that the district court
erred in its decision to exclude eyewitness testimony based on Rules
172
403 and 702. The court stated that “[s]imilar to other types of expert
witnesses . . . experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to juridically pertinent aspects of the human mind and body should generally,
absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be welcomed by federal
courts, not turned away.”173 The court held that when expert testimony of this character satisfies the reliability and fit requirements of
Rule 702, and there is no countervailing rationale for excluding the
evidence under Rule 403, the evidence must be admitted.174 Similarly,
the Sixth Circuit has held that the trial court erred in excluding an
eyewitness-identification expert under 403, specifically not violating
Rule 403’s prohibition against evidence that invites unjustified delay.175
Conversely, the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held
that eyewitness identification expert testimony may be excluded under Rule 403. The Second Circuit, in United States v. Lumpkin, reasoned that eyewitness identification expert testimony might usurp the
jury’s role of determining witness credibility, causing jurors to be confused and misled.176
Similar to Lumpkin, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
United States v. Kime, held that the “district court properly recognized
the very real danger that the proffered expert testimony could either
confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert’s credibility assessment for its own.”177 One difference in this case was that the expert was going to be specific as to whether the testimony of the eye178
witness was credible.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Curry, held that the district court’s exclusion was proper in its exercise
of discretion, whether under Rule 702 or 403.179 The defendants were
convicted for conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to
distribute in excess of fifty kilograms of marijuana.180 On appeal the
defendants raised a number of issues including that the exclusion of
172

United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 340.
174 Id. at 342 (citing United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991)).
175 See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that eyewitness
identification expert testimony did not violate Rule 403’s prohibition against evidence that invites unjustified delay); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).
176 United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999).
177 United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996).
178 Id. at 884.
179 United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992).
180 Id.
173
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181
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification was error. The
district court had excluded the expert testimony on the basis that the
jury is “generally aware” of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony
and the expert would not assist the jury under Rule 702, or it could be
considered unduly confusing or a waste of time under 403.182 The Seventh Circuit also acknowledged that the Rule 702 analysis incorpo183
rates Rule 403.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Eyewitness Identifications
“The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy
[and] [t]he hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable
number of instances in the records of English and American trials.”184
In 1983, Calvin Johnson was convicted of raping a young woman
despite several factors that pointed to his innocence, including him
being clean-shaven and the perpetrator being described as having a
full beard, the victim of another almost identical rape did not initially
identify Johnson as her attacker, and Johnson had four witnesses supporting his alibi.185 Johnson received a life sentence and was not exonerated until 1999, when DNA evidence was examined and Johnson
was not a match.186
Over 77,000 cases per year involve eyewitness identifications, and
only 500 of those cases have expert testimony regarding the accuracy
of eyewitness accounts.187 With numbers like that, it is not hard to see
why eyewitness identifications are so vital to our criminal trial system
and why some courts might be hesitant to allow experts to come in
and explain why eyewitness identifications are not reliable and why
they should not be believed. Yet, juries’ acceptance of these unreliable eyewitness identifications is a leading cause, if not the leading
cause, of wrongful convictions.188
To date, no court has excluded eyewitness identification from tri189
al based solely on its unreliability. But even the Supreme Court has
181

Id.
Id. at 1051.
183 Id. at 1051 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
184 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Case of
Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1928)).
185 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 10-12.
186 Id. at 12.
187 Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups
and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 609 (1998).
188 Overbeck, supra note 117, at 1895-96.
189 O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 752.
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recognized that “despite its inherent unreliability, much eyewitness
190
identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries.” And other
courts have recognized that “[b]ecause eyewitness testimony is such
powerful stuff and can decide a case on its own strength, it can blind a
jury to other exculpatory evidence or inferences.”191
There is a desire for juries to believe eyewitness testimonies.
“All the evidence points rather strikingly to the conclusion that there
is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes
the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says, That's the
one!’”192 Due to this powerful role of eyewitness testimony, courts
tend to want to exclude the expert testimony that would damper such
a big part of the prosecution’s case. However, experts would only
inform the jury of the general phenomena that affect the reliability of
memory, and would help to sensitize the jurors to the effects that different factors may have on an eyewitness’ ability to recount the
193
Some studies have shown that eyewitness experts do not
events.
make jurors skeptical but actually promote an understanding of mem194
ory works in relation to eyewitness accuracy.
Still, if studies dating back to 1923 have concluded that eyewitness identifications are not reliable,195 the impact of these testimonies
should be limited to the best of the trial court’s ability.
B.

Expert Opinion in Courts

In order to comport with Daubert and Rule 702, the expert’s testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and
the witness must aid the trier of fact. The courts finding that expert
opinion on eyewitness testimony does not violate Rule 403 (the Third
and the Sixth Circuits) have noted that if the expert testimony comports with Rule 702 then the lower court erred in excluding it under
Rule 403.196

190

Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1983).
192 Watkins, 449 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting ELIZABETH LOFTUS,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
193 See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of
Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1024-27 (1995) (discussing the use of eyewitness
identification experts in order to give the jury an understanding of how memory works and how
to evaluate an eyewitness’ credibility).
194 Id.; cf. Michael McCloskey & Howard E. Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can a
Psychologist Tell a Jury?, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 550, 552 (1983) (stating that studies have shown the
possibility of expert testimony causing the jury to disregard even credible eyewitnesses).
195 See Hallisey, supra note 3, at 242.
196 See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith, 736
F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).
191
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Rule 403 allows exclusion of evidence on grounds of prejudice,
197
confusion, or waste of time, and eyewitness identification experts, in
general, do not give rise to one of these reasons for exclusion. Rule
403 is written in favor of admissibility, and, as such, the assumption
should be the evidence is admissible, and only in certain circumstances should evidence give rise to exclusion under Rule 403. Because the expert is there to educate the jury in the different factors
that can influence how someone remembers an event, experts in eyewitness identifications do not give rise to exclusion under Rule 403
based on the risk of causing confusion or wasting time.198
One study of the influence of experts found that participants exposed to expert testimony were less likely to convict the defendant —
thirty-nine percent convicted — than participants who had not heard
the expert testimony — fifty-eight percent convicted.199
1. Reliability
Mistaken identification “probably accounts for more miscarriages
of justice than any other single factor.”200 So, increasingly, courts have
begun to allow expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitnesses.
The experts that have been allowed to testify are classically psychologists who specialize in human memory and perception.201
In the 1970s, psychological experts discovered substantial evi202
The experts’
dence that eyewitness testimony is often inaccurate.
testimonies incorporate data that has been subjected to peer review
and the methods these experts use are generally accepted, and, therefore, fit within the Daubert test.203
In cases such as United States v. Smith, when the expert on eyewitness identification has credentials such as a Ph.D. and is a professor, as well as having written articles on the topic, the expert fits with-

197

See FED. R. EVID. 403.
Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 171 (1990).
199 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 9 (1980).
200 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967).
201 O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 755.
202 Overbeck, supra note 117, at 1895.
203 Courts have previously not permitted experts to testify on the basis of their methods
being “unscientific.” See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
that two articles on the topic of lineups did not constitute scientific knowledge within the meaning of Daubert); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the inadmissibility of an expert testimony on eyewitness identification, noting that the defendant failed to
provide data or literature supporting the expert’s opinion).
198
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in the meaning of Daubert and should be permitted to testify so long
204
as the testimony would assist the jury.
2. Assistance to the Jury
Juries “tend to place great weight on eyewitness identifications,
often ignoring other exculpatory evidence.”205 In United States v.
Moore, the court recognized that expert testimony should be admitted
“when there is no inculpatory evidence presented against the Defendant with the exception of a small number of eyewitness identification,” and that “in a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that
identification is admissible and properly may be encouraged.”206 The
argument for eyewitness identification expert testimony begins here,
with the idea that when a defendant is being prosecuted based on a
few eyewitness accounts, the defendant should be allowed to bring
evidence to show that eyewitness identifications are not always accurate, and further can be rather unreliable.
Many courts reject expert testimony about eyewitness identifications on the basis that the flaws of eyewitness identifications are
“common knowledge” and therefore the expert would not assist the
trier of fact and does not comport with Daubert.207 However, as noted
in many scientific studies, jurors do not know the inherent flaws in
eyewitness identification and, therefore, an expert explaining this
would assist them in determining what weight to give to the evi208
dence.
It is true that the common knowledge challenge survived Daubert
and the expert being offered must “assist the jury.”209 Courts cannot
assume, however, that the average juror would be aware of the variables that experts discuss in their testimony of eyewitness reliability,
as some courts argue to be the basis of exclusion of expert testimony
210
Studies have shown that jurors do not
on eyewitness reliability.
have “common knowledge” of the unreliability of eyewitness identification and tend to misunderstand how memory works.211 Courts have
recognized that “potential inaccuracies of cross-racial identifications
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United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1212-13 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
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are not necessarily within the common knowledge of the average ju212
ror or, for that matter, the average judge.”
Some courts keep out eyewitness identification experts because
213
the testimony is “not beyond the ken of the jurors.” In other words,
that expert testimony on the subject will not be helpful to the jury.214
However, the helpfulness requirement in Rule 702 is a liberal standard, and a marginal improvement on the jurors’ understanding is
typically enough.215 Also, there is evidence to show that the information provided by experts on eyewitness identification is often “beyond
the ken” of the jury, and judges as well as jurors often do not have an
understanding of how memory works.216
In United States v. Smith, the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama recognized that in a case where eyewitnesses were
the majority of the evidence against the defendant and the two eyewitnesses to the bank robbery conversed with each other prior to providing the testimony, an expert’s testimony would be helpful and assist the trier of fact in making their determination.217
When expert testimony satisfies the reliability and fit requirements of Rule 702, and when there is no countervailing rationale for
excluding the evidence under Rule 403, the evidence should be admit218
ted.
3. The Issue of Rule 403
The jury’s role is to weigh evidence presented and reach the truth
based on that evidence. The Rules of Evidence were put into place as
219
to enhance the truth-finding process. Bringing in experts to explain
eyewitness identification would not deter from this truth-finding but
rather enhance the jury’s understanding of the truth of how memory
works in order to make a credibility determination.220
But some courts have reasoned that eyewitness identification expert testimony might usurp the province of the jury in determining the

212 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (citing Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 804 N.E.2d 336,
344 (2004) (Cordy, J., concurring)).
213 See, e.g., People v. Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 66-67 (N.Y. 2001).
214 See Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 191-92; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
215 See Schmechel et al., supra note 12, at 191.
216 See id.
217 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
218 United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 342 (3d Cir. 2001).
219 Friedland, supra note 198, at 171-72.
220 See O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 772.
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witness’ credibility and might cause confusion or mislead the jury.
However, the other courts have, more accurately, held that eyewit222
ness-identification expert testimony comports with Rule 403. “[A]n
expert’s opinion does not invade the province of the jury. It is merely
offered as any other evidence, with the expert subject to cross223
examination and the jury left to determine its weight.” If the expert
testimony comports with Rule 702, it should, by reasoning, also comport with Rule 403. “Pragmatically, the helpfulness’ analysis under
Rule 702 effectively predetermines the issue [of Rule 403]. It is unlikely the trial judge will conclude that the testimony will help the jury
resolve a material issue, and then decide the jurors will not be able to
224
understand the evidence or its purpose.”
Rule 704 seems to indicate that the argument used for keeping
expert testimony out under Rule 403 is in fact the type of objection
that was abolished by Rule 704.225
In United States v. Mathis,226 the court reversed the decision from
the district court that excluded eyewitness testimony based on Rules
702 and 403. The court explained that eyewitness-identification experts who employ “reliable scientific expertise to jurdicially pertinent
aspects of the human mind . . . should . . . be welcomed by federal
227
courts.”
The Sixth Circuit has also found it improper to exclude this type
of expert testimony on the basis of Rule 403.228 In United States v.
229
230
Smith, and United States v. Smithers, the court held that eyewitness-identification expert testimony did not violate Rule 403’s prohibition against evidence that invites unjustified “delay.”
The Middle District of Alabama, in United States v. Smith, speaks
specifically to the point that the expert testimony would usurp the
jury’s role.231 The court addresses how it is “within the jury’s exclusive
province” to assess the credibility of one witness, but the court also
221 See, e.g., United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir.
1992).
222 See, e.g., Mathis, 264 F.3d at 339-40; United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.
1984).
223 State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982).
224 Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43
ME. L. REV. 53, 112 (1991).
225 See FED. R. EVID. 704.
226 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001).
227 Id. at 340.
228 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1220 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
229 United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984).
230 United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000).
231 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1220-21.
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notes how Rule 704(b) and the Advisory Committee Notes reject the
notion that some expert testimony is inadmissible because it usurps
232
the province of the jury. The court focuses on how the expert testimony can be helpful “and even essential, to assisting the jury in its
exercise of the exclusive power to determine witness credibility.”233
The court in Smith allowed the expert to testify about eyewitness
identification research and to “educate the jury about empirical evidence regarding the previously specified areas of eyewitnessidentification research,” but the court did not allow him to speak specifically about the witnesses in the case before the court.234
The court concluded the discussion of the admissibility of the expert witness by stating “it is difficult to see how it could possibly be
prejudicial to provide scientifically robust evidence that seeks to correct misguided intuitions and thereby prevent jurors from making
common errors in judgment simply by giving them more accurate in235
formation about issues directly relevant to the case.”
Rule 403 should not be the rule used to exclude expert testimony
on eyewitness identifications. There has been no showing that experts
are a waste of time or going to mislead the jury. Rule 403 being used
as a way to exclude experts does not allow for the defendant to bring
forward relevant evidence that is important to help the jury understand the flaws of eyewitness identifications.
IV. COMMENTARY: REJECTION OF RULE 403 AS A BASIS FOR THE
EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE UNRELIABILITY OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
“Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that they give such testimony great
236
weight.”
Although there is an increasing rate of eyewitness experts being
237
admitted to testify in court, there are still many courts that exclude
this sort of testimony on the basis of either Rule 403 or Rule 702.
In encouraging the use of experts on eyewitness identifications,
the two jurisdictions that allow expert testimony on eyewitness identi-
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fications and find that these experts should not be kept out on the
238
basis of Rule 403 are on the right track.
239
All relevant evidence is presumed to be admissible. The Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Moore held that the eyewitness expert was
properly excluded on the ground that eyewitness identification was
not the key issue, and therefore the proffered expert testimony was
not relevant.240 However, Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence is
any “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”241 and
Rule 402 provides, in part, that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,
242
except as otherwise provided.” As the Rules set forth a presumption of admissibility so long as the evidence has “any tendency” to
determine the truth,243 an eyewitness expert should be admissible,
244
even if the eyewitness identification is not the key issue.
A 403 objection to an expert witness arises after evidence has
been found to be relevant and admissible under Rule 702. But it
should be noted that many 403 objections that would be made are
covered in Rule 702.245 To allow an expert to testify under Rule 702
means that the court has determined that the witness is an expert, the
testimony is based upon a correct application of valid scientific principles, and the evidence is helpful to the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness.246 One of the most common grounds for a 403 objection is unfair prejudice, and it is hard to see how an expert on credibil247
ity is unfairly prejudicial. Also, Rule 403 allows a court to exclude
evidence in order to avoid misleading the jury or creating confusion.248
However, it is unlikely that a trial judge could find that the expert
meets the helpfulness standard under Rule 702 and then find that that
238 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mathis,
264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001).
239 See FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.”).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
241 FED. R. EVID. 401.
242 FED. R. EVID. 402.
243 FED. R. EVID. 401.
244 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 991, 997-98 (2007) (arguing that “the Rules favor admissibility of relevant evidence, which
logically includes expert testimony concerning credibility”).
245 Rule 702 appears supra at text accompanying note 39; see also Mullane, supra note 224,
at 110.
246 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
247 Mullane, supra note 224, at 110-11.
248 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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249
the jury will be mislead or confused by the evidence. Finally, Rule
403 allows exclusion of evidence if the evidence is a waste of time.250
However, “[t]he advisory committee’s note to Rule 702 suggest that
251
helpful expert testimony is never a waste of time.” An expert testifying on the reliability of eyewitness identification is not a waste of
time as it may help the jury decide the credibility of the identification,
and lead to the jury’s ultimate determination of guilt.
Some courts only allow experts if eyewitness identifications are
the only evidence at trial.252 The Fifth Circuit has recognized that expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is not common knowledge and
some of the psychological studies are “counterintuitive.”253 In United
States v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit also specifically rejected the trial
court’s finding that the testimony of the proffered eyewitness expert
was within the common knowledge of the jury.254
The problem with limiting expert testimony to when the only
evidence is eyewitness identification is that will do nothing for the
trials in which other evidence is presented, and, yet, in most trials, the
eyewitness identification still has the greatest weight for the jury. All
eyewitness identifications present some risk of being wrong, and juries
tend to rely on this evidence whether corroborated or not.255
The Third Circuit in United States v. Downing reversed the lower
256
court’s exclusion of an expert witness on eyewitness identifications.
The court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the testimony was
within the common knowledge of the jury and determined that the
testimony “can assist the jury in reaching a correct decision” and
therefore should be admitted “at least in some circumstances.”257 The
court held that Rule 403 is “especially significant when there is evi258
dence of a defendant’s guilt other than eyewitness evidence.” The
problem with Downing is that the court had reserved the right for the

249 Mullane, supra note 224, at 112; see also Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1032
(1995).
250 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
251 Mullane, supra note 224, at 113 (quoting the advisory committee stating that “[w]hen
expert opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a
waste of time”).
252 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that expert
testimony “may be encouraged” if the only evidence against the defendant is identification
evidence).
253 Id. at 1312.
254 United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105-06 (6th Cir. 1984).
255 See O’Hagan, supra note 79, at 767.
256 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
257 Id. at 1231-32.
258 Id. at 1243.
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trial court to utilize Rule 403 in order to exclude eyewitness testimo259
ny. The court accepted the fact that an expert’s testimony may be
excluded if the testimony is too general or not “sufficiently tied to the
260
facts of the case.” And, contrary to Downing, it should be the government who bears the burden of showing the evidence should be
261
excluded on the basis that it is irrelevant.
The Third Circuit in Mathis recognized that excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification on the basis of 403 was unwarranted.262 The court found that “[w]ith respect to the District Court’s
concern with ‘confusing and misleading the jury’ and ‘unfair prejudice,’ we are unable to discern from these references . . . how such
problems might arise.”263 This court also recognized that these experts
do not usurp the function of the jury. “Similar to other types of expert witnesses, who might testify about the flaws of a computerized
filing system or the proper interpretation of satellites photographs,
experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to juridicially pertinent
aspects of the human mind and body should . . . be welcomed by federal courts.”264 As appreciated in Mathis, the experts are not there to
tell the jury whether to believe the eyewitness account, but rather “to
provide information that, if deemed credible, might cause the jury to
265
evaluate [the eyewitness’] testimony in a different light.”
The jury ultimately will determine the witness’s credibility in a
trial, but an expert should be able to come in to assist the jury in making their ultimate credibility determination, deciding whether to believe an eyewitness’ account of an event.266
Eyewitness identifications are among the most important forms
of evidence presented in criminal trials and mistaken identifications
appear to be the most frequent source of wrongful convictions.267 Accordingly, the defendant in a criminal case should be able to bring in

259

Id.
Id. at 1242.
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262 United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court erred
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resources that are going to help him or her against this heavily
268
weighted testimony.
Expert testimony should be admitted if the expert comports with
Rule 702. To exclude on the basis of Rule 403 seems in direct conflict
with Rule 704. As Rule 704 got rid of the “usurping the province of
269
the jury” objection, courts should no longer be using this as a way to
exclude expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications. The need for such eyewitness experts is because jurors should
be aware of the inherent flaws in this sort of testimony and be weary,
not putting the amount of weight that they normally would.
It should be noted that appellate courts recognize that trial courts
270
Also,
are in a better position to strike a Rule 403 balancing test.
when the trial court does engage in the balancing process it articulates
the rationale for its conclusion and that the conclusion “should rarely
271
be disturbed.”
Under the Federal Rules this sort of evidence is admissible, and if
the crux of the prosecutor’s case relies on an eyewitness, an expert
should be allowed to come in and inform the jury on the unreliability
of eyewitness identifications so that the jury can make a more informed decision when determining the credibility of the eyewitness.
There is an underlying fear that jurors will be skeptical,272 but is
that not the point? Often, eyewitness testimony is not accurate, but in
order to keep eyewitness testimony as a major part of trials, courts fall
back on Rule 403 to exclude experts that may demystify this crucial
evidence.
Case after case demonstrates how eyewitness testimony makes all
the difference and defendants should be allowed to bring in relevant
evidence273 including experts on eyewitness identification reliability.274
268 Another important aspect to insuring proper eyewitness identification is through documentation. Documenting the eyewitness’ statement immediately after the identification can be
essential to preserving the eyewitness’ account of events and insuring the most accuracy as possible. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 7.
269 See FED. R. EVID. 704(a); see also, e.g., State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1219 (Ariz.
1983) (“[T]he worry about invading the province of the jury has been solved for us by the provisions of Rule 704 . . . which permits opinion testimony even though it embraces an ultimate
issue.’”).
270 Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1992).
271 Id.
272 See United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1300 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[P]sychologists
warn that expert testimony may detrimentally affect a jury, in that jurors may be overly skeptical
of an eyewitness' testimony as a result of the expert's testimony.”).
273 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides, in part, that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided,” and Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that relevant
evidence is any “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”
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275
As Rule 403 is designed to favor admissibility, it should not be that
the default is keeping out the expert testimony but that the expert
testimony should be allowed in unless there is a showing that unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.
Courts fear that this sort of evidence on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony will lead to the total disbelief of eyewitnesses, thus
eliminating one of the strongest forms of evidence that can be offered
by a prosecutor. But “[t]he hope in admitting expert testimony is for
an informed jury that is more realistically skeptical of eyewitness
identifications. It is impossible to know whether the admission of expert testimony will actually lead to few convictions of the innocent,
but the many cases of misidentification mandate a change.”276
Eyewitness identifications are too unreliable and courts should
therefore allow defendants to put forward the best evidence they can
to combat this heavily weighted testimony. Courts need to recognize
that eyewitness expert testimony can protect against the risk of incorrect, uncorroborated eyewitness identification, and in allowing these
experts to come in, protect those defendants who are incorrectly identified. Courts should recognize the importance of eyewitness experts
that will assist the jurors in understanding the unreliability of eyewitness accounts, and therefore will not give undue weight to the evidence.
Other avenues of bringing about the unreliability of eyewitness
identification, such as cross-examination and jury instructions, are not
as effective as expert testimony,277 although some courts still insist that
cross-examination should be enough to bring out the flaws in eyewit278
ness identification. The problem with just using cross-examination
in order to combat the eyewitness testimony is that the eyewitness
believes her story to be true, and therefore is not susceptible to the
279
usual cross-examination tactics.
Per se exclusion of eyewitness identifications is obviously not an
option. Prosecutors heavily rely on eyewitness identifications and
these identifications play too large a part in the criminal justice system
to get rid of them entirely. However, admitting eyewitness experts
allows for the court to maintain an equal balance between the necessary eyewitness and the right of a defendant to have a fair trial. Dis-
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trict courts should follow the parameters set up by circuit courts that
have encouraged expert testimony and not excluded this evidence on
the basis of 403.
V. CONCLUSION
“ Eyewitness identification error, usually unintentional, is the
factor that is most often associated with wrongful convictions.’ Yet,
eyewitness testimony is the most persuasive form of evidence used by
280
prosecutors to convict alleged criminals.”
In over seventy percent of the first eighty-two DNA exonerations, mistaken eyewitness identification was a factor and was the
leading cause of wrongful convictions;281 and it has been estimated that
282
up to eighty percent of the time juries believe eyewitnesses. With
these numbers, criminal defendants should be able to defend themselves against wrongful accusations by eyewitnesses by having an expert educate the jury on the different factors that affect memory and
perception.
Courts are moving toward a more lenient standard and, following
the guidance of Rule 702 and Daubert, are allowing more experts to
come in to testify on the unreliability of eyewitness identifications.283
There is a shift toward admissibility, although many courts are still
excluding on the basis of Rule 702 or 403, this sort of expert testimony
should be admissible if the expert demonstrates expertise, and the
testimony might, if accepted by the jury, help them decide a fact at
284
issue.
Other methods are not enough: Cross-examination and jury instructions are inadequate when determining the inaccuracies of eyewitness identifications.285 Expert testimony is the best tool available
and it is difficult to imagine that an expert appearing to testify about
the inaccuracies of eyewitness identifications would substantially out286
weigh as to lead to this evidence being excluded. Therefore, Rule
403 should not be the basis for an exclusion of experts. Perception
and memory complexities are not within the common knowledge of
280 Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, “I Was Put Out the Door with Nothing”- Addressing the
Needs of the Exonerated Under a Refugee Model, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 405, 411 (2009).
281 Sarah Anne Mourer, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Procedures Under the Fourth
Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 49, 54 (2008).
282 Id. (citing Gary L. Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 278
(1980)).
283 See Overbeck, supra note 117, at 1912.
284 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
285 See Overbeck, supra note 117, at 1905.
286 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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the juror, and as such, expert testimony would not be a waste of time
287
or cause undue delay. These experts are not coming in to sit as the
fact-finder, but rather are there to give the fact-finder more information so that they understand the complexities of memory and will not
heavily rely on eyewitness identification.
While having these experts might not be a panacea for false identifications and faulty convictions, it has the capability for allowing a
jury to be more discerning in their ability to weigh evidence involving
eyewitness identifications.

287 See Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Eyewitness Identification: Issues in Common Knowledge and Generalization, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 159, 161 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).

